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OPINION 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 About a year after approving a merger agreement that 
called for the payment of a $275 million termination fee under 
certain conditions, the Bankruptcy Court in this Chapter 11 
case admitted that it had made a mistake, granted a motion for 
reconsideration, and narrowed the circumstances under which 
the termination fee would be triggered.  Were it not for the 
order granting reconsideration, Appellant NextEra Energy, Inc. 
would now be entitled to payment of the $275 million fee out 
of the bankruptcy estates.  In pursuit of the payment, NextEra 
argues in this appeal that the Bankruptcy Court had it right the 
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first time and should have never granted the motion for 
reconsideration.  NextEra contends first that the motion was 
untimely, before arguing alternatively that the motion should 
have been denied on the merits because the termination fee 
provision, as originally drafted, was an allowable 
administrative expense under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b).  We, 
however, conclude that the Bankruptcy Court did not err in 
either respect.  The motion for reconsideration was timely, and 
the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
it.  We will therefore affirm.   
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Approval of the Merger Agreement and 
Termination Fee 
 Shortly after initiating Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceedings, Debtors Energy Future Holdings Corp. (“EFH”) 
and Energy Future Intermediate Holding Company LLC 
(“EFIH”) began marketing their approximately eighty-percent 
economic interest in the rate-regulated business of Oncor 
Electric Delivery Co. LLC, the largest electricity transmission 
and distribution system in Texas.1  On July 29, 2016, Debtors 
entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger with NextEra, 
under which NextEra would acquire Debtors’ interest in 
Oncor.  The Merger Agreement, which reflected an 
approximately $18.7 billion implied total enterprise value for 
                                                 
 1 To be precise, Debtors in the underlying consolidated 
Chapter 11 proceeding are EFH and fourteen of its 
subsidiaries, including EFIH.   
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Oncor, stated that NextEra would provide approximately $9.5 
billion in consideration to Debtors’ estates.   
 The Agreement also included a Termination Fee 
provision, which obligated Debtors to pay NextEra $275 
million if the agreement was terminated under certain 
circumstances.  As Debtors’ counsel later acknowledged 
before the Bankruptcy Court, this provision was “incredibly 
detailed.”  App. 547.  It began by providing that Debtors would 
be required to pay the Termination Fee—sometimes referred 
to as a break-up fee— 
[i]f this Agreement is terminated . . . and any 
alternative transaction is consummated 
(including any transaction or proceeding that 
permits the [Debtors] to emerge from the 
Chapter 11 Cases) pursuant to which neither 
[NextEra] nor any of its Affiliates will obtain 
direct or indirect ownership of . . . approximately 
80% equity interest in Oncor.  
App. 182.  In other words, payment would be triggered if 
NextEra did not ultimately acquire Debtors’ interest in Oncor 
and Debtors either sold Oncor to someone else or otherwise 
emerged from the bankruptcy proceedings.  But the provision 
then proceeded to list a number of exceptions to this default 
rule.  It provided, for instance, that the Fee would not be 
payable if the parties mutually consented to terminate the 
Merger Agreement prior to closing, or if Debtors terminated 
because NextEra was in breach of the Agreement.   
 Most importantly for purposes of this appeal, the Fee 
provision also included an exception that was to govern if the 
Public Utility Commission of Texas (“PUCT”) did not approve 
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the merger.  That part of the provision stated that payment 
would not be triggered if the Agreement was “terminated . . . 
by [NextEra] . . . and the receipt of PUCT Approval (without 
the imposition of a Burdensome Condition) [wa]s the only 
condition . . . not satisfied or waived in accordance with this 
Agreement.”  App. 182 (emphasis added).  The Fee provision 
said nothing, however, about whether the $275 million would 
be owed if, due to the PUCT’s declining to approve the 
Agreement, Debtors took the initiative to terminate rather than 
NextEra.  Thus, under those circumstances, the default rule 
applied:  If the PUCT rejected the merger and Debtors 
consequently terminated the Agreement, they would owe 
NextEra $275 million upon the consummation of an alternative 
deal, regardless of whether that alternative was better for the 
estates.   
 Before the Merger Agreement could take effect, 
Debtors were required to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy 
Court, so, within days of finalizing the Agreement with 
NextEra, they filed an appropriate motion with the court.  In 
that Approval Motion, Debtors explained the Termination Fee 
provision as follows:   
 Upon Court approval of the Merger 
Agreement, EFH Corp. and EFIH are liable for 
the Termination Fee, in the amount of $275 
million, as an allowed administrative expense 
claim, in the event of certain termination events 
in accordance with the Merger Agreement.  The 
Termination Fee is not payable in the event of, 
among other things, certain terminations 
resulting from breaches by NextEra or Merger 
Subsidiary or following a termination by 
NextEra at the Termination Date (as defined in 
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the Merger Agreement) where PUCT approval is 
the only closing condition not satisfied. . . .   
 The Merger Agreement includes 
provisions that allow for any higher or otherwise 
better bids to emerge.  From the execution of the 
Merger Agreement until entry of the Approval 
Order, the Debtors may solicit, initiate, and 
facilitate higher or otherwise better offers 
without paying the Termination Fee. . . .  If the 
Debtors terminate the Merger Agreement 
following entry of the Approval Order to accept 
another proposal, and the transaction 
contemplated by such other proposal is 
consummated, the Debtors would owe the $275 
million Termination Fee. 
App. 397–98 (citation omitted).   
 On September 19, 2016, after several creditors objected 
to the proposed merger, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing 
regarding the Approval Motion.  During that hearing, William 
Hiltz, a member of Debtors’ financial advisory team testified 
about whether the Termination Fee would be triggered upon 
failure to achieve approval from the PUCT:   
THE COURT:  [I]f the Court confirms the 
. . . NextEra deal, and that plan does not 
consummate because of a failure to achieve 
regulatory approval, is the break-up fee payable?   
MR. HILTZ:  If the Debtor enters into another 
transaction, the answer is yes.   
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THE COURT:  But if this transaction simply 
falls apart because you don’t get regulatory 
approval from the Public Utility Commission?   
MR. HILTZ:  Well, again, I think if the Debtor 
enters into another transaction including a 
reorganization involving its own creditors . . . it 
would be payable.   
THE COURT:  . . . [B]ecause if this plan gets 
confirmed for Debtors—not anything the 
Debtors do wrong, they don’t get the regulatory 
approval they need—this falls apart and a year 
and a half from now they confirm a different plan 
that’s not even a sale plan, say it’s a standalone 
plan, that break-up fee would be payable? 
MR. HILTZ:  I believe so.   
App. 535.  Although Hiltz’s testimony did not address the 
critical distinction between whether it was Debtors or NextEra 
that initiated the termination upon PUCT disapproval, it was 
otherwise accurate: payment of the Fee did not necessarily 
hinge on whether either party was at fault for the PUCT’s 
failure to approve, and the “alternative transaction” that would 
trigger payment did not need to be a sale plan.  Rather, as Hiltz 
acknowledged to the Bankruptcy Court, the alternative could 
be a standalone plan—meaning a resolution without the 
involvement of a third party, under which at least some 
creditors would have to agree to accept less than one hundred 
percent payment and instead take debt and/or equity issued by 
a reorganized company.   
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 Later on at the hearing, however, Debtors’ counsel 
contradicted Hiltz’s testimony.  Initially, counsel informed the 
court that the Fee would not be payable if the PUCT rejected 
the plan and “NextEra walk[ed].”  App. 541.  But minutes later, 
counsel added: 
Suffice to say there’s no break-up fee if the 
PUC[T] just denies—outright denies approval.  
But if the PUC[T] imposes the burdensome 
condition which is a significant hurdle, . . . a 
break-up fee is triggered.  
App. 547.  This statement was inaccurate in that the triggering 
of the Fee did not turn on whether the PUCT outright rejected 
the merger or instead imposed a “burdensome condition,” 
which a different provision of the Merger Agreement defined 
with specificity.  Rather, as we have said, whether the Fee 
became payable upon PUCT disapproval hinged on whom it 
was that took the initiative to terminate the agreement—
Debtors or NextEra.  Thus, it was incorrect to state “there’s no 
break-up fee if the PUCT . . . outright denies approval.”  In 
reality, if the PUCT flat-out rejected the merger, the Fee would 
be payable, so long as it was the Debtors who terminated.   
 Debtors’ counsel’s misstatement was never corrected 
during the September 19 hearing, though, and at the conclusion 
of the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order 
approving the Merger Plan and Agreement.  The Approval 
Order authorized Debtors to enter into the merger, approved 
the Termination Fee on the terms provided for in the 
Agreement, and authorized Debtors to pay the Termination Fee 
to NextEra as an allowable administrative expense to the extent 
it became due and payable under the Agreement.  The Order 
further provided that, in the event the Fee became payable, 
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EFH and EFIH would agree on the allocation of the payment 
between their respective estates, and then seek the Bankruptcy 
Court’s approval of such allocation.  If EFH and EFIH were 
ultimately unable to agree on how to divide the payment, the 
Order stated that the Bankruptcy Court “would determine the 
appropriate allocation of the Termination Fee” between the 
estates.  App. 455.  Indeed, the Bankruptcy Court, was to 
“retain jurisdiction over any matter or disputes arising from or 
relating to the interpretation, implementation or enforcement 
of th[e] Order.”  App. 456.  
 Later reflecting on Debtors’ Approval motion, the 
objections raised by the various creditors, and the September 
19 hearing, the Bankruptcy Court would state that no one 
“focused the Court on a critical fact: the Merger Agreement did 
not set a date by which approval by the [PUCT] had to be 
obtained.”  App. 19.  “Consequently,” the court wrote, no party 
made it aware “that if the PUCT did not approve the NextEra 
Transaction, the Debtors could eventually be required to 
terminate the Merger Agreement and trigger the Termination 
Fee unless NextEra terminated first of its own volition.”  App. 
19–20 (emphasis omitted).  And, according to the court, “under 
no foreseeable circumstances would NextEra terminate the 
Merger Agreement . . . [b]ecause NextEra had the ability to 
hold out . . . until the Debtors were forced by economic 
circumstances to terminate.”  App. 26 (emphasis omitted).  Put 
differently, because there was no date by which PUCT 
approval had to be obtained before the merger dissolved 
automatically, in the face of regulatory rejection, NextEra 
could simply be patient, pursue all possible appeals, and wait 
for Debtors to terminate first, which would allow NextEra to 
collect the $275 million Termination Fee.  
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B. The Bankruptcy Court’s Reconsideration of the 
Approval Order 
 On September 22, 2016, three days after the Bankruptcy 
Court entered the Approval Order, the PUCT held a hearing at 
which one of its Commissioners expressed concerns over the 
Fee.  Perhaps due to Debtors’ counsel’s misstatement at the 
September 19 hearing before the Bankruptcy Court, the 
Commissioner appeared to be under the false impression that 
the Fee would be payable if the PUCT imposed burdensome 
conditions, but not if it outright rejected the merger.  And 
perhaps partly based on that impression, he stated that the 
Termination Fee “appear[ed] to be an effort to really tie the 
[PUCT’s] hands” and force it to approve the merger without 
any burdensome conditions.  App. 690.  In the Commissioner’s 
eyes, if the PUCT imposed certain conditions on its approval, 
then NextEra would just hold out for payment of the 
Termination Fee, which the Commissioner feared might come 
from Debtors’ “only asset,” Oncor—to the detriment of 
Oncor’s customers.  App. 694.  NextEra’s purported hope, 
then, according to the Commissioner, was that the PUCT 
would be reluctant to trigger payment of the Fee, and would 
therefore approve the merger as proposed in order to prevent 
such payment.   
 In the aftermath of the Commissioner’s statement, 
Debtors and NextEra submitted a letter to the Bankruptcy 
Court on September 25, seeking to clarify the terms of the 
Termination Fee provision.  The letter began by stating the 
parties’ joint view was that “NextEra Energy is not entitled to 
a termination fee under the merger agreement if NextEra 
Energy terminates the merger agreement because the [PUCT] 
either approves the merger agreement transaction with 
‘burdensome conditions’ (as defined in the merger agreement) 
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or does not approve the merger agreement transaction.”  App. 
702.  This statement corrected part of Debtors’ counsel’s 
misstatement from the September 19 hearing, but it did not 
address the critical related issue: what would happen if the 
PUCT rejected the merger or approved it with burdensome 
conditions and NextEra did not terminate.   
 That issue the letter waited until the penultimate 
paragraph to discuss:  
In other words, the $275 million termination fee 
is triggered if EFH and/or EFIH terminate the 
merger agreement as a consequence of the 
Commission either not approving the merger 
agreement transaction or approving the merger 
transaction with the imposition of imposing of a 
burdensome condition.  In order for EFH and/or 
EFH to pursue an alternative transaction, EFH 
and EFIH believe that they would only terminate 
in such a situation if they had an alternative 
proposal to pursue.  The termination fee is not 
triggered if, under the same circumstances 
NextEra Energy terminates the merger 
agreement instead of EFH and/or EFIH.   
App. 702.  Importantly, like the Approval Motion and the 
testimony at the September 19 hearing, the letter neglected to 
explain that the Merger Agreement did not set a date by which 
approval by the PUCT had to be obtained before the merger 
dissolved on its own.    
 The next day, at a previously scheduled hearing, the 
Bankruptcy Court detoured from the agenda to address the 
comments of the PUCT Commissioner and the parties’ 
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subsequent letter.  The court acknowledged that it was 
“sympathetic” to the Commissioner’s concerns, but it appeared 
to be put at ease by the parties’ letters.  App. 715.  According 
to the court, in the letter, “the parties clarified that . . . NextEra 
will not seek to collect any portion of the termination fee 
contemplated by the merger agreement in the event NextEra 
terminates” because of PUCT rejection or PUCT approval with 
burdensome conditions.  App. 716.  Again, though, it never 
came up that that the Merger Agreement did not provide a date 
by which PUCT approval had to be achieved.  Instead, the 
court proceeded to briefly address the Commissioner’s concern 
that Oncor would be on the hook for the Termination Fee if it 
became payable.  It spelled out that the fee was “an issue for 
the Bankruptcy Court and the creditors of EFH and EFIH, and 
not for the PUCT, Oncor, and the rate payers,” because if the 
fee was triggered it would “constitute an administrative 
expense claim payable by EFH and EFIH.”  App. 717.  
Consequently, the court “encourage[d] the [PUCT] to review 
the proposed merger . . . with an unblinking eye and in no way 
to be influenced by the possible triggering of the termination 
fee.”  App. 718.  The court then moved on to the previously 
scheduled agenda.  It made no changes to the September 19 
Approval Order.   
 The next month, NextEra and Oncor submitted their 
Joint Application for change of control of Oncor to the PUCT.  
The Application asked for the PUCT to drop two central 
features of a “ring-fence” the PUCT had previously imposed 
on Oncor when it was owned by Debtors: (1) the requirement 
that Oncor maintain an independent board of directors, and (2) 
the ability of certain minority shareholders to veto dividends.  
NextEra would not negotiate with regard to either feature, 
leading members of the PUCT to refer to them as “deal killers.”  
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E.g., App. 765, 772.  In April 2017, the PUCT formally denied 
the Joint Application, concluding that the merger was not in 
the public interest under the Texas Public Utility Regulatory 
Act.  The parties subsequently filed two requests for 
reconsideration, but NextEra continued to hold firm on the 
deal-killer terms.  The PUCT denied both requests for the same 
reasons provided in its original decision.   
 According to the Bankruptcy Court, at this point, the 
merger was “clearly dead.”  But NextEra showed no 
indications of terminating the agreement.  Instead, it filed an 
appeal in Texas state court.  In the words of the Bankruptcy 
Court, NextEra made it “clear that [it] would appeal the 
PUCT’s decision to all levels of review, leaving the Debtors no 
choice but to terminate the Merger Agreement and risk 
triggering the Termination Fee or else incur months or years of 
continued interest and fee obligations.”  App. 28.   
 On July 7, 2017, Debtors formally terminated the 
Merger Agreement based on the failure to obtain regulatory 
approval and NextEra’s alleged breach of the Agreement.  The 
same day, Debtors entered into a different merger agreement 
with another party.   
 A few weeks later, on July 29, 2017, Appellees Elliott 
Associates, L.P., Elliott International, L.P., and The Liverpool 
Limited Partnership (collectively, “Elliott”), who are creditors 
of Debtors, filed the motion to reconsider at issue in this 
appeal.  In its motion, Elliott sought reconsideration of the 
Approval Order to the extent that the Approval Order 
authorized Debtors to pay the Termination Fee under 
circumstances where the parties failed to obtain PUCT 
approval and Debtors were resultantly forced to terminate the 
Agreement in order to pursue an alternative transaction.  
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Within days, NextEra filed a competing application with the 
Bankruptcy Court seeking allowance and payment of the 
Termination Fee upon Debtors’ consummation of the 
alternative transaction, to which Elliott objected based on the 
same grounds as in its motion to reconsider.   
 The Bankruptcy Court ultimately granted Elliott’s 
motion, explaining that it had “fundamentally misapprehended 
the facts as to whether the Termination Fee would be payable 
if the PUCT failed to approve the NextEra Transaction.”  App. 
45.  The court rejected NextEra’s argument that the motion was 
untimely, concluding instead that the Approval Order was 
interlocutory because it “d[id] not resolve all issues relating to 
the Termination Fee,” such as the allocation of the Fee between 
the Debtors’ estates.  App. 36.  In the alternative, the court 
ruled that it was appropriate to grant the motion even if the 
Approval Order was a final order, because “the interest of 
justice outweigh[ed] the interest of finality.”  App. 45.   
 On the merits, the court concluded that, had it possessed 
complete knowledge of the facts at the time the Approval 
Motion was filed, it could not have approved the Termination 
Fee.  Specifically, the court held that the Fee was not an 
“actual, necessary cost[] and expense[] of preserving the 
estate” under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A), because “[p]ayment of 
a termination or break-up fee when a court (or regulatory body) 
declines to approve the related transaction cannot provide an 
actual benefit to a debtor’s estate sufficient to satisfy” the 
statutory requirement.  App. 43.   
 Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court amended the 
Approval Order to provide that:  
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The Termination Fee, upon the terms and 
conditions of the Merger Agreement, is approved 
in part and disallowed in part.  The Termination 
Fee is disallowed in the event that the PUCT 
declines to approve the transaction contemplated 
in the Merger Agreement and, as a result, the 
Merger Agreement is terminated, regardless of 
whether the Debtors or NextEra subsequently 
terminates the Merger Agreement.  In those 
circumstances, the EFH/EFIH Debtors are not 
authorized to pay the Termination Fee as a 
qualified administrative expense or otherwise.  
The Termination Fee is otherwise approved.   
App. 12.  NextEra then filed a timely appeal of the Bankruptcy 
Court’s decision, and this Court agreed to hear the appeal 
directly and on an expedited basis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d)(2).   
 
II. JURISDICTION 
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 157 and 1334(b).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d)(2).   
III. DISCUSSION 
 On appeal, NextEra argues that the Bankruptcy Court 
erred in granting Elliot’s motion to reconsider for two 
independent reasons.  First, NextEra contends that the motion 
should have been denied because it was untimely.  Second, 
NextEra argues that, even if the motion was timely, it should 
have been denied on the merits because, regardless of any 
misapprehension of the facts, the Bankruptcy Court was right 
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in its initial determination that the Termination Fee, as 
originally drafted, was an allowable administrative expense 
under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b); thus, in NextEra’s view, there was 
no error of law requiring correction.   
A. The Timeliness of Elliott’s Motion for 
Reconsideration 
 As the Bankruptcy Court correctly recognized, the 
timeliness of Elliott’s motion depends in part on whether the 
September 19, 2016 Approval Order was an interlocutory or a 
final order.  The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure do not 
expressly authorize motions for reconsideration.  But 
bankruptcy courts, like any other federal court, possess 
inherent authority, see Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 420–21 
(2014), and such authority permits courts to reconsider prior 
interlocutory orders “at any point during which the litigation 
continue[s],” as long as the court retains jurisdiction over the 
case, State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Cty. of Camden, 824 F.3d 399, 406 
(3d Cir. 2016).  Thus, if the Approval Order was interlocutory, 
no strict time limit applied to Elliott’s motion for 
reconsideration.   
 If, on the other hand, the Approval Order was final, 
Elliot’s motion would be subject to the time restrictions of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60.  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 
(providing that, with limited exceptions, Rule 60 applies in 
cases under the Bankruptcy Code); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (“On 
motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party . . . from a 
final judgment, order or proceeding.”).  When based on 
mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud, a motion 
brought under Rule 60(b) must be brought within one year of 
the entry of the underlying order, and under all circumstances, 
such a motion “must be made within a reasonable time.”  Fed. 
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R. Civ. P. 60(c).  Here, Elliott’s motion was filed less than a 
year after the Approval Order was filed, but NextEra argues 
that the motion was not made within a reasonable time because, 
according to NextEra, Elliott could have raised its arguments 
at the time the merger was initially approved.   
 We generally review timeliness determinations for an 
abuse of discretion.  See Bailey v. United Airlines, 279 F.3d 
194, 202–03 (3d Cir. 2002) (reviewing for abuse of discretion 
determination that motion for summary judgment was timely); 
see also In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 
(3d Cir. 1982) (“[M]atters of docket control . . . are committed 
to the sound discretion of the District Court.”).  But the 
threshold question of whether the Approval Order is 
interlocutory or final is a legal issue that turns on the 
interpretation of Rule 60—that is, whether the Approval Order 
constitutes a “final . . . order” under the Rule.  We exercise 
plenary review over such questions involving the interpretation 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Garza v. Citigroup, 
Inc., 881 F.3d 277, 280 (3d Cir. 2018).  Accordingly, here, we 
first exercise plenary review over the Bankruptcy Court’s 
conclusion that the Approval Order was interlocutory.  Once 
we have answered that initial question, we review any 
remaining aspects of the Bankruptcy Court’s timeliness 
determination for an abuse of discretion.  See Bailey, 279 F.3d 
at 202–03.   
 Turning to the initial question, we begin by noting that 
the rules of finality and appealability are different in the 
bankruptcy context than in ordinary civil litigation.  Because 
“[a] bankruptcy case involves ‘an aggregation of individual 
controversies,’” Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 
1692 (2015) (quoting 1 Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, 
Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 5.08[1][b] (16th ed. 2014)), “Congress 
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has long provided that orders in bankruptcy cases may be 
immediately appealed if they finally dispose of discrete 
disputes within the larger case,” id. (quoting Howard Delivery 
Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 657 n.3 
(2006)).  Indeed, the bankruptcy appeals statute “authorizes 
appeals of right not only from final judgments in cases but from 
‘final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . in cases and 
proceedings.’”  Id. (omission in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)).   
 In light of these general principles, we have adopted a 
flexible, pragmatic approach to finality in the bankruptcy 
context.  Century Glove, Inc. v. First Am. Bank of N.Y., 860 
F.2d 94, 97 (3d Cir. 1988).  Among the factors relevant to this 
approach are “(1) ‘the impact of the matter on the assets of the 
bankruptcy estate,’ (2) ‘the preclusive effect of a decision on 
the merits,’ and (3) ‘whether the interests of judicial economy 
will be furthered’” by an immediate appeal.  In re Marcal 
Paper Mills, Inc., 650 F.3d 311, 314 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 
F/S Airlease II, Inc. v. Simon, 844 F.2d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 1988)).  
The ultimate question, however, is whether the order “fully and 
finally resolved a discrete set of issues, leaving no related 
issues for later determination.”  In re Taylor, 913 F.2d 102, 104 
(3d Cir. 1990); see also Bullard, 135 S. Ct. at 1692. 
 Applying a flexible, pragmatic approach here, we agree 
with the Bankruptcy Court that the Approval Order was 
interlocutory.  Assuming the “discrete set of issues” for 
purposes of finality was those related to the Termination Fee 
provision, the Order still reserved questions for later 
determination.  For one, the Order did not resolve how the Fee 
would be allocated between EFH’s and EFIH’s respective 
estates in the event it became payable.  Rather, at a minimum, 
the Order required the Bankruptcy Court to approve an 
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allocation proposed by EFH and EFIH at a later date.  Thus, 
the Fee could not be paid without further court action.  If EFH 
and EFIH were unable to agree on such an allocation, the Order 
provided that the Bankruptcy Court would have to determine 
an appropriate allotment.  That the Approval Order left this 
allocation question unanswered is critical to the finality 
analysis, because it means that the impact of the Order itself on 
the assets of the respective estates was both uncertain and far-
off.  The later allocation determination very well might have 
had significant effects on the rights of other interested parties, 
too, as we can assume that EFH and EFIH do not share all of 
the same creditors.  Even in the flexible, pragmatic world of 
bankruptcy, “[f]inal does not describe th[e] state of affairs” 
when “parties’ rights and obligations remain unsettled.”  
Bullard, 135 S. Ct. at 1692.   
 It was not only the allocation issue that remained up in 
the air either.  Although the Approval Order authorized 
Debtors to enter into the Merger Agreement and pay the 
Termination Fee “to the extent it bec[a]me[] due and payable 
pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Merger 
Agreement,” the Order also expressly provided that the 
Bankruptcy Court was “retain[ing] jurisdiction over any matter 
or disputes arising from or relating to the interpretation, 
implementation or enforcement of th[e] Order.”  App. 455–56.  
As it turns out, such a dispute has arisen: in a separate 
adversary complaint that is not at issue in this appeal, Debtors 
have alleged that, even if the Termination Fee provision were 
enforced as originally drafted and approved, NextEra still 
would not be entitled to the Fee, because, according to Debtors, 
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NextEra breached the Merger Agreement.2  It is exactly this 
kind of dispute over which the Bankruptcy Court retained 
jurisdiction in the Approval Order.  Because the Approval 
Order left open the possibility that the Bankruptcy Court would 
need to decide when the Fee was payable, it was uncertain that 
the Order itself would have any impact on the estates without 
further court action.   
 Nonetheless, according to NextEra, the discrete 
question for purposes of finality here was whether the 
Termination Fee provision satisfied the legal standard 
applicable to administrative expenses under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 503(b).  In NextEra’s view, the Approval Order was final 
because, by its own terms, it provided that the Termination Fee 
was approved “without any further proceedings before, or 
order of, the Court.”  App. 455.  But this argument overlooks 
the fact that the Order’s very next sentence provided the 
significant caveat that the Bankruptcy Court would have to 
approve the allocation of the Fee between the estates.  Thus, as 
we have said, in reality, the Fee could not have been paid until 
further court action took place.   
                                                 
 2 Debtors’ adversary complaint, which seeks a 
declaratory judgment, was filed in the Bankruptcy Court before 
Elliott’s motion for reconsideration was granted.  See 
Adversary Complaint, Energy Future Holdings Corp. v. 
NextEra Energy, Inc., (In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.), 
Ch. 11 Case No. 1:14-bk-10979, Adv. No. 17-50942 (Bankr. 
D. Del. Aug. 3, 2017).  At oral argument before this Court, 
counsel for NextEra represented that the adversary proceeding 
has been put on “hiatus” pending our resolution of this appeal.  
Tr. of Oral Arg. at 11.   
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 Also, the Supreme Court recently rejected a conception 
of finality that “slic[ed] the case too thin.”  Bullard, 135 S. Ct. 
at 1692 (dismissing Debtor’s argument that “each time the 
bankruptcy court reviews a proposed plan . . . it conducts a 
separate proceeding” for purposes of the bankruptcy appeals 
statute).  NextEra’s proposed conception here, in our view, 
would do just that: single out a particular question about a 
particular provision of a merger agreement, chop it off of the 
broader case, and deem it its own separate issue.  This 
conception takes our flexible, pragmatic approach to finality 
too far.   
 Because we conclude that the Approval Order was 
interlocutory, Elliott’s motion to reconsider was subject to no 
explicit time restriction.  Instead, the only timeliness argument 
that NextEra might have is the doctrine of laches.  To assert a 
laches defense, NextEra would have to show that Elliott 
inexcusably delayed its motion and that NextEra was 
prejudiced as a result of such a delay.  Tracinda Corp. v. 
DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 226 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Laches is an equitable doctrine, however, and the decision of 
whether to recognize it as a defense in a particular case is left 
to the discretion of the lower courts.  Id.  Here, we cannot say 
that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in refusing to 
bar Elliott’s motion because of laches.  The motion was filed 
less than a year after the Approval Order was issued, within 
weeks of Debtors terminating the Merger Agreement, and 
actually before NextEra had even filed its application seeking 
payment of the Termination Fee.  The Fee provision in the 
Merger Agreement was also complicated, and the record was 
muddled at the time the Bankruptcy Court was making its 
approval decision.  Under these circumstances, we are unable 
to conclude that Elliott inexcusably delayed the filing of its 
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motion.3  The Bankruptcy Court therefore did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that the motion was timely.   
B. The Merits of Elliott’s Motion for Reconsideration 
 1. The Applicable Legal Standard  
 Turning to the merits of Elliott’s motion, we must first 
identify the applicable legal standard.  We have, on occasion, 
stated that lower courts “possess[] inherent power over 
interlocutory orders, and can reconsider them when it is 
consonant with justice do so.”  State Nat’l Ins. Co., 824 F.3d at 
417 (quoting United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 605 (3d Cir. 
1973)); see also Roberts v. Ferman, 826 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 
2016) (“‘[T]he law of the case doctrine does not limit the 
power of trial judges to reconsider their prior decisions,’ but 
. . . when a court does so, it must explain on the record why it 
is doing so and ‘take appropriate steps so that the parties are 
not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling.’” (quoting 
Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997))).  The 
Bankruptcy Court here, however, thought that its task required 
                                                 
 3 NextEra argues that we should bar Elliott’s motion as 
untimely because “the alleged infirmities forming the basis” of 
the motion “all occurred (or failed to occur) before the 
Bankruptcy Court entered the Approval Order.”  Appellant’s 
Br. at 28–29.  And yet, according to NextEra, “Elliott sat on its 
hands for nearly a year, waiting to see if it would reap the 
benefits of a successful transaction induced by approval of the 
Termination Fee.”  Id. at 33.  The Bankruptcy Court was better 
equipped than we are to evaluate this contention, however, and 
there simply is no evidence in the record before us that Elliott 
acted with the motive NextEra alleges.   
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a little more.  In part because bankruptcy proceedings 
“involve[] the routine entry of interlocutory orders,” the 
Bankruptcy Court concluded that parties in bankruptcy cases 
should not be permitted to relitigate previously decided issues 
“without good cause.”  App. 30.  The court therefore subjected 
Elliott’s motion to the same standard that governs motions to 
alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(e).  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023 (incorporating 
Rule 59).  According to that standard, such a motion should be 
granted only where the moving party shows that at least one of 
the following grounds is present: “(1) an intervening change in 
the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that 
was not available when the court [made its initial decision]; or 
(3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent 
manifest injustice.”  United States ex rel. Schumann v. 
Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 848–89 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. 
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)).   
 In our view, the Bankruptcy Court’s approach makes 
sense, at least in the context of an order approving a merger 
agreement and accompanying termination fee provision.  If 
courts could freely amend any interlocutory bankruptcy order, 
the larger proceedings would be fraught with uncertainty, and 
parties could never rely on prior decisions.  Accordingly, we 
will assess the merits of Elliott’s motion using the same 
standard employed by the Bankruptcy Court.   
 In seeking reconsideration, Elliott has not alleged an 
intervening change in the law or the availability of new 
evidence.  Its motion is instead based entirely on the third basis 
for reconsideration provided above: the need to correct a clear 
error of law or fact or prevent manifest injustice.  In granting 
the motion, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that it “had a 
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fundamental misunderstanding of the critical facts when it 
[initially] approved the Termination Fee” because it was 
unaware that the Merger Agreement did not set a date by which 
PUCT approval had to be obtained.  App. 38.  This factual 
error, the court said, led it to incorrectly apply the law 
governing the permissibility of termination fees in bankruptcy 
cases.  According to the court, had it “properly apprehended 
the facts at the time” it was considering Debtors’ Approval 
Motion, “it could not have approved” the Termination Fee 
provision as it was originally drafted.  App. 44.  In other words, 
the Bankruptcy Court had committed “manifest errors” of both 
fact and law, which required the court to amend the September 
19 Approval Order so that payment would not be triggered 
when the Merger Agreement was terminated—by either 
party—as a result of the PUCT’s failure to approve the 
transaction.  App. 47.   
 To affirm, we need only conclude that the Bankruptcy 
Court committed a clear error of fact or law, as the relevant 
standard is disjunctive.  See, e.g., Howard Hess Dental Labs. 
Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citing Max’s Seafood, 176 F.3d at 677).  We have never 
adopted strict or precise definitions for “clear error of law or 
fact” and “manifest injustice” in the context of a motion for 
reconsideration, and we do not endeavor to do so here.  We 
have, however, suggested that there is substantial, if not 
complete, overlap between the two concepts.  See, e.g., id. 
(“The purpose of a motion for reconsideration . . . is to correct 
manifest errors of law or fact . . . .” (first alteration in original) 
(quoting Max’s Seafood, 176 F.3d at 677)).  To state what may 
be obvious, the focus is on the gravity and overtness of the 
error.  See, e.g., Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 253 (7th Cir. 
2015) (“A ‘manifest error’ occurs when the district court 
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commits a ‘wholesale disregard, misapplication or failure to 
recognize controlling precedent.” (quoting Oto v. Metro Life. 
Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000))); Venegas-
Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 195 (1st Cir. 
2004) (“[A] manifest error is ‘[a]n error that is plain and 
indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the 
controlling law.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Black’s Law Dictionary 563 (7th ed. 1999))).  Thus, Elliott 
must show more than mere disagreement with the earlier 
ruling; it must show that the Bankruptcy Court committed a 
“direct, obvious, [or] observable error,” Manifest Injustice, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), and one that is of at 
least some importance to the larger proceedings.   
 Despite this heightened standard, we review a lower 
court’s determination regarding a motion to reconsider for an 
abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Howard Hess, 602 F.3d at 246.  
To the extent the Bankruptcy Court’s determination was based 
on factual findings, we review such findings for clear error.  Id.  
To the extent its determination was “predicated on an issue of 
law, such an issue is reviewed de novo.”  Max’s Seafood, 176 
F.3d at 673 (italics omitted).  Here, however, we are presented 
with no such legal issue, because the decision to allow or deny 
a termination fee is itself reviewed for only an abuse of 
discretion.  See In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d 
200, 205 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 2. The Bankruptcy Court’s Claimed Error of 
Fact 
 Review of the Bankruptcy Court’s purported factual 
error is relatively straightforward.  The parties agree that the 
Merger Agreement did not set a date by which PUCT approval 
had to be achieved.  Although the Bankruptcy Court made no 
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express finding on the subject before it issued the Approval 
Order, it later said that it was unaware that the Agreement 
failed to provide such a date.  As a starting point, we think the 
best source for information about the Bankruptcy Court’s 
subjective understanding is the court itself.  Indeed, we must 
accept the Bankruptcy Court’s factual conclusions regarding 
its own subjective understanding unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  See Max’s Seafood, 176 F.3d at 673; cf. Monsanto 
Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 748 F.3d 1189, 1198 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (reviewing for clear error district court’s 
findings that a party “had made factual misrepresentations of 
its subjective understanding”).  We see no reason to second-
guess the Bankruptcy Court’s admission that it initially failed 
to recognize the absence of a deadline for PUCT approval, 
because there was no mention of any such deadline in Debtors’ 
Approval Motion, the September 19 hearing testimony, or the 
September 25 letter submitted by Debtors and NextEra.   
 NextEra contends that it would have been unusual for 
the Agreement to include a deadline for regulatory approval 
and that “[a]ccordingly, there was no need for the parties to call 
attention to the fact that the transaction followed standard 
market practice.”  Appellant’s Br. at 18.  But even assuming 
NextEra is correct in its description of standard market 
practices, its argument addresses a different issue than the one 
before us.  NextEra’s contention is essentially that the 
Bankruptcy Court should have developed an accurate 
understanding of the facts in the first instance based on the 
record that was developed.  Our inquiry is more limited, 
though.  The relevant question for our purposes is whether the 
Bankruptcy Court—justified or not—misapprehended the 
facts at the time it issued the Approval Order.  Absent any 
indication in the record that the Bankruptcy Court knew that 
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the Merger Agreement did not include a deadline for PUCT 
approval, we cannot say that the court’s findings with regard 
to its own subjective understanding were clearly erroneous.   
 3. The Bankruptcy Court’s Claimed Error of 
Law and Decision to Reconsider the 
Approval Order 
 Of course, the significance of the Bankruptcy Court’s 
error of fact depends on how the error impacts the underlying 
legal determination—that is, the permissibility of the 
Termination Fee under the original terms of the Fee provision.  
If the factual error was central to the relevant legal calculus, 
we think it appropriate to deem it a clear or manifest error 
warranting reconsideration.  If, on the other hand, the factual 
error had only a tangential impact on the legal determination, 
the Bankruptcy Court would have abused its discretion in 
concluding that it was a manifest error.  The question then 
would be whether, setting aside the factual error, the 
Bankruptcy Court had committed a legal error so indisputable 
and fundamental that it rose to the level of a manifest error of 
law.   
 The legal calculus begins with our decision in Calpine 
Corp. v. O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc. (In re O’Brien 
Environmental Energy, Inc.) (O’Brien), 181 F.3d 527, 532 (3d 
Cir. 1999), where we held that courts do not have the authority 
to “create a right to recover from [a] bankruptcy estate where 
no such right exists under the Bankruptcy Code.”  As a result, 
termination fees are subject to the same general standard used 
for all administrative expenses under 11 U.S.C. § 503, which, 
in relevant part, permits the payment of post-petition 
administrative expenses only to the extent that they constitute 
“the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the 
30 
 
estate,” 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2012). See O’Brien, 181 
F.3d at 535.  In light of this statutory requirement, we rejected 
application of a business judgment rule, under which a 
requested termination fee would be approved if the debtor had 
a good faith belief that the fee would benefit the estate.  
O’Brien, 181 F.3d at 535.  “[T]he allowability of break-up 
fees,” we said, instead “depends upon the requesting party’s 
ability to show that the fees [a]re actually necessary to preserve 
the value of the estate.”4  Id.   
 How can a termination fee provide such a benefit to a 
debtor’s estate?  In O’Brien, we recognized two possible ways.  
First, we said that “such a benefit could be found if assurance 
of a break-up fee promoted more competitive bidding, such as 
by inducing a bid that otherwise would not have been made and 
without which bidding would have been limited.”  Id. at 537.  
Second, “if the availability of break-up fees and expenses were 
to induce a bidder to research the value of the debtor and 
convert the value to a dollar figure on which other bidders can 
                                                 
 4 We explained that this standard applies to all requests 
for terminations fees, as long as the claimed right to recover 
“arose after [the debtor] filed for bankruptcy protection and 
began marketing its assets for sale.”  O’Brien, 181 F.3d at 532; 
see also id. at 535 (reasoning that there existed no “compelling 
justification for treating an application for break-up fees and 
expenses under § 503(b) differently from other applications for 
administrative expenses”).  Thus, it is immaterial that O’Brien 
differed from this case in that the bankruptcy court there “had 
specifically denied breakup fees as part of the sale process.”  
Dissenting Op. at 4.  Here, like in O’Brien, NextEra’s right to 
recover the Termination Fee arose after Debtors had initiated 
the bankruptcy proceedings.  O’Brien therefore applies.   
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rely, the bidder may . . . provide[] a benefit to the estate by 
increasing the likelihood that the price at which the debtor is 
sold will reflect its true worth.”  Id.  A decade after O’Brien, 
we identified a third way a termination fee could preserve the 
value of an estate: by assuring that a bidder “adhered to its bid 
rather than abandoning its attempt to purchase . . . in the event 
that the Bankruptcy Court required an auction for [the] sale” of 
the relevant asset.  In re Reliant Energy, 594 F.3d at 207.   
 It bears emphasis, however, that we have always said 
these are ways a termination fee might confer a benefit on an 
estate.  See, e.g., O’Brien, 181 F.3d at 537 (explaining that 
these were instances “where a benefit could be found” or 
“may” be found).  We have never held that bankruptcy courts 
must allow fees whenever they find that one of the above 
features is present.  Rather, it is ultimately within a bankruptcy 
court’s discretion to approve or deny a termination fee based 
on the totality of the circumstances of the particular case.  See 
In re Reliant Energy, 594 F.3d at 205.  Exercising that 
discretion and taking into account all of the relevant 
circumstances, the bankruptcy court must make what is 
ultimately a judgment call about whether the proposed fee’s 
potential benefits to the estate outweigh any potential harms, 
such that the fee is “actually necessary to preserve the value of 
the estate,” O’Brien, 181 F.3d at 535.  See In re Reliant Energy, 
594 F.3d at 208 (holding that the bankruptcy court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying a proposed fee when the 
“potential harm to the estate the break-up fee would cause by 
deterring other bidders from entering the bid process 
outweighed” the benefit the fee might have conferred by 
securing a bidder’s adherence to its bid).   
 Here, the Bankruptcy Court’s error of fact means that 
the Bankruptcy Court had overlooked a significant potential 
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harm when it initially approved the Termination Fee as drafted 
by the parties.  The Bankruptcy Court failed to initially 
recognize that Debtors had essentially gambled on PUCT 
approval.  If the PUCT declined to approve the merger, Debtors 
would owe the $275 million Termination Fee unless NextEra 
took the initiative to terminate the Agreement first.  But the 
Bankruptcy Court did not appreciate that, since the Merger 
Agreement included no deadline by which PUCT approval had 
to be obtained before the deal would dissolve on its own, 
NextEra had little incentive to terminate the agreement first on 
its own volition.  Instead, NextEra could simply wait for 
Debtors to terminate, which would trigger payment of the $275 
million Fee.  Under those circumstances, the Termination Fee 
would provide no benefit to estates.  It would in fact be 
detrimental: not only would the estates be out $275 million, but 
Debtors would be back to square one and, with the passage of 
time, in a worse off position—desperate to accept an 
alternative transaction.   
 Due to its factual error, the Bankruptcy Court failed to 
weigh this potential harm to the estates against the potential 
benefits.  There is no question that the Termination Fee 
conferred some benefit by inducing NextEra to make the 
highest bid that Debtors received.  See O’Brien, 181 F.3d at 
537.  But we cannot look at that benefit in a vacuum.  Unlike 
the circumstances contemplated in O’Brien, NextEra’s bid was 
not designed to provide a competitive benefit.  And although 
the Termination Fee was intended to induce NextEra to adhere 
to its bid, see In re Reliant Energy, 594 F.3d at 207, this benefit 
was potentially negated by the perverse incentive that could 
result.  Indeed, the Fee provision would potentially induce 
NextEra to adhere to its bid in a particular way.  It would allow 
NextEra to hold firm against any burdensome conditions.  
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Rather than negotiate on its “deal killer” conditions, NextEra 
could remain uncompromising and pursue appeals until 
Debtors were forced to terminate the Agreement out of 
financial necessity.   
 Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we do not 
think the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in concluding 
that a scenario where “Debtors were forced to terminate the 
Merger Agreement . . . because NextEra had the Debtors in a 
corner . . . would have been predictable” had the court 
possessed a complete understanding when it initially approved 
the Termination Fee.5  With an accurate view of the facts, one 
would have seen that, by inducing NextEra’s bid, the 
Termination Fee might eventually maximize the value of the 
estates—assuming the deal closed.  This the Bankruptcy Court 
recognized at the outset.  But the Fee also created substantial 
financial risk if the PUCT did not approve the transaction and, 
as a result, closing did not take place.  When it initially 
approved the Fee, the Bankruptcy Court did not fully 
appreciate this risk.  A court also could have, in exercising its 
discretion, determined that the Fee provision would itself make 
closing less likely to occur, because if the PUCT imposed 
conditions that NextEra did not like, NextEra would have less 
                                                 
 5 Contrary to the Dissent’s suggestions, see Dissenting 
Op. at 2, the Bankruptcy Court, in its opinion, stated explicitly 
that it was not using hindsight when reconsidering the issue of 
whether the Termination Fee was allowable, and we see 
nothing in the record or the Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning that 
contradicts this disclaimer.  We therefore need not reach the 
question of whether it is permissible for a court to act based on 
hindsight when considering a proposed termination fee’s 
compliance with O’Brien.   
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reason to compromise and could instead simply wait for the 
Debtors to terminate and trigger payment of the $275 million 
Fee.  This problem the Bankruptcy Court, by its own 
admission, completely missed when it approved the Fee.   
 In sum, the Termination Fee provision had the potential 
of providing a large benefit to the estates, but it also had the 
possibility to be disastrous.  Once it had a complete 
understanding, the Bankruptcy Court properly weighed the 
various considerations and determined that the potential 
benefit was outweighed by the harm that would result under 
predictable circumstances.  In other words, the risk was so 
great that the Fee was not necessary to preserve the value of 
Debtors’ estates.  Having made such a determination, the 
Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
Fee in part.6   
 The Bankruptcy Court also did not abuse its discretion 
in concluding that its previous factual error was a clear or 
manifest one that justified the partial denial of the Fee on a 
motion for reconsideration.7  As we have already explained, 
                                                 
 6 According to the Dissent, it was error for the 
Bankruptcy Court to “engage[] in an after-the-fact assessment 
of benefit to the estates as if no initial approval had been 
granted.”  Dissenting Op. at 4.  But an “after-the-fact 
assessment” is inevitable in the context of a motion for 
reconsideration, and the court did not act “as if no initial 
approval had been granted.”  Rather, as we have said, it 
subjected itself to the heightened Rule 59(e) standard.   
 7 We therefore need not reach the question of whether 
the court also committed a manifest error of law and do not 
hold, as the Bankruptcy Court did, that “[p]ayment of a 
35 
 
the error of fact was obvious and indisputable.  Indeed, 
NextEra concedes that the Merger Agreement did not include 
a date by which PUCT approval had to be obtained.  The 
factual error also had a substantial impact on the Bankruptcy 
Court’s O’Brien analysis, as the above discussion illustrates.  
The error led the court to fundamentally misjudge the 
likelihood that the Termination Fee would be harmful to the 
estates.   
 To be sure, we have said that when a court reconsiders 
a prior decision, it must “take appropriate steps so that the 
parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling.”  
Roberts, 826 F.3d at 126 (quoting Williams, 130 F.3d at 573).  
Here, NextEra purportedly spent a significant amount of 
money in its attempt to obtain PUCT approval.  As NextEra 
acknowledges, however, it has an alternative way to seek 
reimbursement for those expenses: its Application for 
Allowance and Payment of Administrative Expenses in the 
amount of nearly $60 million is currently pending before the 
Bankruptcy Court.  We are also mindful of the fact that 
NextEra believed for roughly a year that it would be entitled to 
payment of the Termination Fee if Debtors terminated the 
Agreement due to the PUCT’s declining to approve the merger, 
and that NextEra formed expectations accordingly.  But we 
                                                 
termination or break-up fee when a court (or regulatory body) 
declines to approve the related transaction can[] [never] 
provide an actual benefit to a debtor’s estate sufficient to 
satisfy the O’Brien standard,” App. 43.  We hold only that the 
Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 
that, in this particular case, the risk of harm was so great that 
the Termination Fee was not necessary to preserve the value of 
Debtors’ estates.   
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think general principles of reliance were adequately protected 
in this case by the heightened Rule 59(e) standard that the 
Bankruptcy Court employed.   
 That the heightened standard was satisfied here is in and 
of itself proof that this case is anomalous.  Reconsideration was 
warranted only because the Bankruptcy Court failed to discern 
a critical fact that profoundly altered the underlying legal 
determination.  If we were presented with anything less, our 
conclusion may very well have been different.  
Reconsideration remains a form of relief generally reserved for 
“extraordinary circumstances.”   In re Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432, 439 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 
800, 816 (1988)).  And yet, it is also a form of relief generally 
left to the discretion of lower courts.  That, of course, is no 
accident.  It is a product of our recognition that some “fact-
bound issues . . . are ill-suited for appellate rule-making,” 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 565 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc), and that the matters under our review have often been 
“decided by someone who is thought to have a better vantage 
point than we on the Court of Appeals,” id. (quoting United 
States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 234 (3d Cir. 2004)).  See 
generally id. at 564–66 (discussing principles underlying the 
abuse of discretion standard in both civil and criminal cases).  
In this case, we have little doubt that the Bankruptcy Court was 
“better positioned . . . to decide the issue[s] in question.”  
McLane Co., Inc. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1166–67 (2017) 
(quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560 (1988)).  
Having examined the record and the Bankruptcy Court’s 
reasoning closely, we cannot say that it abused its discretion in 
taking the unusual step of reconsidering its prior decision.   
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
Bankruptcy Court’s Order granting Elliott’s motion for 
reconsideration.   
In re:  ENERGY FUTURE HOLDINGS CORP. 
No. 18-1109 
          
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  
While I am reluctant to dissent because I have no 
doubt that the Bankruptcy Court carefully considered its 
decision to reverse course and disallow the previously 
approved Termination Fee, two significant aspects of this 
case concern me: first, the grant of a delayed reconsideration 
motion when there had been no clear error of fact or law, and, 
second, the flawed analysis of the benefit to the estates as 
though there had been no pre-approval of the Fee as part of 
the Merger Agreement.  I conclude that the Bankruptcy Court 
abused its discretion in granting reconsideration, and, 
therefore, I disagree with the Majority’s affirmance of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order. 
  
Admittedly, the facts of the case presented a difficult 
situation for the Bankruptcy Court.  The Next Era deal would 
have brought $9.5 billion to the estates.  When that deal failed 
to obtain regulatory approval, the Debtors were forced to 
terminate and seek a new deal, which would bring “materially 
less” to the estates.1  The Bankruptcy Court was thus faced 
                                              
1 Elliott Br. at 19.  
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with the prospect of further depleting the estates by payment 
of the $275 million Termination Fee.2 
 
 Nonetheless, the reconsideration of the previously 
approved Fee was uncalled for.  The Bankruptcy Court may 
have “misapprehended” that the Fee would be payable in the 
situation that developed, but this was no legal or factual error.  
It was simply a failure to appreciate a particular set of 
potential consequences which became apparent in the light of 
day.  But hindsight cannot justify nullifying a material term of 
the deal that was struck with all of the facts on the table.  
Here, the parties fully appreciated the potential scenarios at 
the time the Fee was initially approved.  Indeed, when Elliott 
filed the reconsideration motion, the Debtors—who had every 
incentive to cry foul as to the initial deal and avoid paying the 
Fee—opposed Elliott’s motion, calling the motion 
“Machiavellian.”3 
 
The Bankruptcy Court seems to say that had it 
appreciated this eventuality, it would not have approved the 
Fee, but this defies logic and common sense.  The Court had 
considered the Fee and its importance to the deal extensively 
in its initial approval of it as part of the Merger Agreement.  
                                              
2 I submit that the fact that the Debtors were left to accept a 
less favorable deal is the real culprit.  Had the Debtors 
terminated to pursue a higher and better offer after regulatory 
approval of the Next Era deal was denied, there would have 
been no reconsideration of the initial approval of the fee.  
Indeed, that would have been a common scenario that the Fee 
guarded against.  Thus, the issue of the denial of regulatory 
approval or an end date for approval is a red herring.  
3 A. 1206. 
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The many benefits to the estates were apparent to the 
Bankruptcy Court.  In particular, the Court stated, “I think the 
evidence overwhelmingly indicates that a breakup fee was 
necessary to induce NextEra to make a bid, and to move 
forward with a merger agreement,”4 and “[i]t’s clear that the 
termination fee went up at the end of the process but it went 
up primarily, I believe, because they walked away from the 
match right, and the combination of match right, lower 
breakup fee was replaced with no match right and a higher 
breakup fee.”5  With regard to the size of the Fee, the Court 
concluded, “[1.47%] is an appropriate number for a case of 
this size”—that is, $18.7 billion—and “[t]he evidence is clear 
that this is on the low end of utility-type transactions [and] on 
the low end of this Court’s experience with regard to breakup 
fees that I have approved numerous times.”6  Clearly, the Fee 
was a necessary and integral aspect of the deal.  Indeed, 
NextEra would have “walked” without it.7  The Debtors 
urged the Court to approve the Fee as part of the deal, lest 
they have to go “back to the drawing board.”8  The 
Bankruptcy Court engaged in a thoughtful assessment of the 
Fee’s value to the deal.9  Thus, there was no legal flaw in the 
                                              
4 A. 578. 
5 A. 579. 
6 A. 578. 
7 A. 483-85. 
8 A. 549. 
9 Although, as explained below, the controlling precedent, 
O’Brien and Reliant, involved consideration of the fee when 
presented later as a cost of administration, rather than when 
pre-approved as part of a sale agreement, the “benefit” or 
“value” of the fee is the standard for both.  See, e.g., In re 
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-11204, 2009 WL 
4 
 
original approval, let alone a clear error.  Therefore, 
reconsideration was unwarranted. 
 
 But the Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning suffers from 
another infirmity.  It engaged in an after-the-fact assessment 
of benefit to the estates as if no initial approval had been 
granted, citing to O’Brien and Reliant.  The Court reasoned 
that the Fee was not an allowable administrative expense 
under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) because “[p]ayment of a 
termination or break-up fee when a court (or regulatory body) 
declines to approve the related transaction cannot provide an 
actual benefit to a debtor’s estate sufficient to satisfy the 
O’Brien standard.”10  The Court considered what did happen 
and conducted an O’Brien analysis anew.  But this after-the-
fact assessment of benefit was improper because the Fee had 
initially been approved as part of the Merger Agreement. 
 
O’Brien and Reliant are distinguishable because, in 
those cases, the court had specifically denied breakup fees as 
part of the sale process.  The issue before us involved the 
denial of the later, post-sale requests for the fee by the 
unsuccessful bidders as an administrative expense under § 
503.11  As the Majority notes here, in the Approval Order the 
                                                                                                     
3242292 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2009), rev’d in part on 
other grounds, 418 B.R. 548 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (using O’Brien 
to analyze whether to authorize a breakup fee pre-auction). 
10 A. 43. 
11 It is interesting to note that in both O’Brien and Reliant, the 
bankruptcy courts did not dismiss the unsuccessful bidders’ 
later requests out-of-hand but seriously considered the role 
their bids had played in moving the sale process forward 
when assessing the value to the estates.  The Bankruptcy 
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Bankruptcy Court had already authorized the Debtors to pay 
the Fee as an allowable administrative expense that preserved 
value for the estates to the extent it became due and payable 
under the Merger Agreement.12 
 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit has noted this tension in In re ASARCO, L.L.C., 650 
F.3d 593 (5th Cir. 2011).  There, the Court observed that 
“[t]he unsuccessful bidders in O’Brien and Reliant Energy 
sought payment for expenses incurred without the court’s pre-
approval for reimbursement, and thus section 503 was the 
proper channel for requesting payment.”  Id. at 602.  Here, 
due to the previous approval, the Bankruptcy Court’s analysis 
of the after-the-fact benefit to the estates—or lack thereof—
was misplaced.  The Fee had been properly approved as part 
of the Merger Agreement, and there was no issue of 
allowance after the fact of an administrative expense.  All that 
remained was to allocate and pay the previously approved 
Fee.  There is no place in our precedent for a “double” § 503 
analysis, where a party could seek approval of a fee as a term 
of a deal and then get another bite at the O’Brien apple, 
urging there was no value, if the deal sours.  And yet that is 
what the Bankruptcy Court did here. 
 
 The reconsideration of a previously approved term of a 
deal, based on a bankruptcy court’s failure to appreciate all of 
                                                                                                     
Court’s reasoning here, however, focused on later events, 
namely the denial of regulatory approval, as depriving the bid 
of value.  I suggest this was off target, even if it had not been 
an abuse of discretion to entertain a motion for 
reconsideration. 
12 Majority Op. at 10. 
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the potential ramifications of the term, sets a troubling—if not 
dangerous—precedent.  Parties to commercial transactions 
present the terms of the deal to the court for approval and, 
once approved, are entitled to rely on the court’s order, which 
is based on a thoughtful, well-reasoned analysis.  Here, that 
should have been the guiding principle, and the grant of 
reconsideration so as to nullify the previously approved Fee 
when there was no clear error of fact or law was an abuse of 
discretion. 
